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IN

THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
K.L.C.

INCORPOP~~TED,

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

RON :1cLEAN,
Defendant-Appellant
and Third-Party
• ti
. __
ff
_
P 1 ain
.J..

vs.
KEARN' S

LIQUIDATION

Auneal No. 1.11.13

CENTER, :

Inc., a corporation, and

JOHN PARA.S,
Third-Party
Defendants-Respondents.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an action to recover money
from plaintiff-respondent.

T~e

misa~propriated

counterclaim asks for an

accounting.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOT-.TER COURT

On October 20, 1967, plaintiff filed suit against

~on

McLean who entered a counterclaim.
On October 15, 1981, the Court entered an Or1er dismissing this case with prejudice for lack of Drosecution.

-1 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents submit the Order of the District Court
dismissing the case with prejudice should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1967, Kearns Liquidation Center, Inc., filed suit
against Ron McLean for payment on goods received by defendant.

Defendant submitted an Answer, and Third-Party Complaint

against plaintiff and John Paras in November, 1967.
Plaintiff and counter-defendant submitted 'L1otice of
Readiness for Trial on December 11, 1967.
Trial settings were made for December

1 ..,

-~-

' 196g, February

13, 1969, and March 19, 1069, but no triA-1 was ever held.
A new trial date was set in 1976, but litigation was avoided
on a stipulation

~repared

by defendant.

provided tllat following defendant's

The Stipulation

accountin~

business records, "the above-entitled matter

of plaintif+:'s

ma~r

't>e dismis-

sed or the results of the examination used as a basis for
judgment pursuant to further consideration bv the Court."
(CR 53). Plaintiff entrusted its cornorate books and records
to defendant's attorney, Dwight L. King, Esq., for inspection
and auditing.

From that point, both sides

as unworthy of any further action.

dro~ped

the matter

Defendant produced no

formal accounting as a basis for judgment.

The :>laintiff

and counter-defendant have no knowledP;e of the nresent location

- '? Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the original corporate records.

Defendant's third at-

torney received no records upon his predecessor's withdrawal.
Finally, in March of 1980, defendant again obtained
new counsel. M.C. Morley, plaintiff Corporation's bookkeener
and an essential witness, had by this time passed away but
Mr. John Paras did his best to respond during defendant's
deposition on July 18, 1980. In spite of very diligent searching, plaintiff's Corporate records could not be found and
this dearth of essential information is reflected in May

5, 1981 answers to defendant's

interro~atories.

As it became clear that it was

i~uossible
.

(CR

62-55).

for the resoondents
'·

to effectively prepare for trial, motion to dismiss for lack
of prosecution was made. Upon argument before the Court on
October 5, 1981, dismissal with prejudice was granted for
lack of prosecution.

ARGUMENT

POINT I:
THE APPELLANTS HAVE NO BASIS FOR A CLAI~1 01? E~ROR ON
APPEAL BECAUSE DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE T.JAS P~OPER

UNDER UTAH CASE LAW AND RULE 4l(b) OF UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.

Rule

L~l

(b) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires

that "for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute ... a defendant may move
against him."

~or

dismissal 0£ an action or of any claim

The plaintiff, or in this case the counter-

plaintiff, has the responsibility to ciiligentl:r prosecute
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his claim.

Serious delays in the prosecution of a claim

can result in unfair prejudice to one side. The reason for
the rule is that memories dim, evidence deteriorates and
is lost over ten years and

occasionally a key witness dies.

The State of Utah has a strong line of recent authority
supporting dismissal in cases where litigation has remained
dormant for an extended period of time. The key case under
this line of authority is Westinghouse Electric Supply Compa
vs. Paul W. Larson Contractors, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah
1975).

The Court examined the issue of whether granting

the Motion to Dismiss with prejudice was an abuse of discretion.

The Court indicates that

t~e

trial Court should have

reasonable latitude of discretion in dismissing for failure
to prosecute if a party fails to move forward according to
the rules and directions of the Court without justifiable
excuse. The Court outlines four factors for

determinin~

whether there is a justifiable excuse for delay: length of
time, conduct of both parties, difficulty or prejudice to
the moving party, whether injustice may result from dismissa
In this case the suit has been pending for fourteen
years and has remained dormant with no action at all for
five years.

This is not a case of unusually complicated

discovery as in

~Jestinghouse.

In fact appellant offers no

excuse for his inaction before and after 1976.

Respondents
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sought and were prepared for trial on many

occasions.

In

particular respondents were prepared for trial several times
in 1968 and also in 1976. But appellant avoided trial in

1976 by obtaining the .stipulation found in the Record at
53.

Pursuant to that stipulation,

ap~ellant

took control

of the corporate records but then lapsed into inaction again.
He did not fashion a settlement on the basis of plaintiff's
records or make any accounting as agreed.

Both sides again

dropped the matter as unworthy of further time and effort.
The third factor considered in Hestinghouse is prejudice
from delay upon one side.

In this case, the difficulties

resulting from delayed prosecution are very evident.
corporate records cannot be found.

The

It would appear that

these records were last in the hands of respondent's attorney.
A key witness who might have provided evidence from memory
• t l1e a b sence o £ recor d s h as passe d away . mh
• .C-f._icu
•
1 ties
•
in
.!.1 ese d
. l.L

have made counter-defendant's trial preparation nearly impossible.

In considering the fourth factor, the counter-ulaintiff

had all the corporate records in his hands in 1076 but didn't
pursue his desired remedy.

Now there are no records for

an accounting and appellant's failure to act obviates any
injustice from a dismissal.
While appellant offers no excuses for his delays over
fourteen years he seeks relief from a default judgment which
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would result in substantial prejudice and injustice to the
adverse party.

Appellant suggests that his diligence in

preparing for trial in 1981 should cure his failures over
the years prior to that time.

Respondents sought dismissal

only after a diligent, good faith effort to marshal infermation for trial.

Must a defendant move for dismissal im-

mediately in a case of unreasonable delay?
Rule. 41 (b) sets no deadline for the moving party
to act; indeed, the Court retains inherent power
to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute pursuant to its own motion. It can hardly be asserted
that a defendant must, on pain of iriplied T.·1aiver,
move within a certain time limit, when the Court
may issue a dismissal order without any action whatsoever on the part of the parties ..
~'1i ls on v. Lambert, 613 P. 2d 765, 768
(Utah 1980).
Wilson vs. Lambert is a case where dism.issal for failure
to prosecute was upheld on appeal.

The coraplaint was filed

in March, 1968, and the matter was set for trial in 1973,
but the plaintiff's attorney was unable to handle the trialg
Plaintiff vacated another trial date in 1977. More than nine
years after the original complaint was filed, the Court issued, sua sponte, an order to the parties to

ap~ear

and show

cause why the action would not be dismis.sed because of failure to prosecute.

Upon a hearing, the Court referred

matter to the trial calendar.

t~e

Plaintiff began discovery

procedures, but nine months later defendant filed a motion
to dismiss for failure to diligently prosecute, which motion
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!1,\\

•

'"

j. .,

was granted.
"There can be little argument regarding the propriety of the dismissal here appealed from.
Plaintiff's predecessor in interest personally delayed
the consideration of the denied applications by
the lower Court from 1968 until the time of his
death in 19750 Thereafter, plaintiffs, even following the approval of their purchase from Baldwin's
estate by the probate Court, delayed sixteen months
before even inaugurating discovery in the matter.
No explanation justifying such delay is offered
in the arguments or in the record".
613 P.2d 765, 768.
Just as in Wilson v. Lambert, this case was set for trial
and co1mter-plaintiff engaged in discovery orocedures.
Brasher Motor and Finance Company vs. Brovm, 23 U.2d

247, 461 P.2d 464 (1969), is a failure of prosecution case
wherein dismissal was upheld.

In Brasher Motor, suit was

filed and defendants filed a counterclaim.

Justice Henriod

writes that "everyone treated the litigation with a silent
reverence accorded that which is interred---until, lo and
behold, five and one-half years later the Browns, like Abou
Ben Adhem, awoke from a deep dream of peace, and attempted.
to exhume and reactivate what for all intents and
appeared to have been a litigious corpse."

pur~oses

The Court on

its own motion dismissed the complaint and counterclaim.
After a delay of five and one-half years with absolutely
no action on either side, the Court indicated that "~Je believe and hold that in the instant case the trial Court did
not abuse its discretion, but on the contrary acted with
judicial propriety looking to the interests of all litigants
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and in promoting their causes with reasonable dispatch

'
certainly in preventing indiscriminate jostling and clogging
-

of Court calendarso" 461 P.2d 464,465.
The case of Johnson v. Firebrand, 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah

1977) does not apply to this case.

In

John~,

the

movin~

party had not even filed an answer until making the motion
to dismiss and the Court made much of this fact.

"(I)n view

of the fact that new counsel caused the case to be activated,
it seeras that the Court abused its discretion in dismissing
the case on a motion to dismiss that was filed at the same
time as the answer"

(571Po2d1368, 1370).

Utah Oil Co.

v. Harris, 565 P2d 1135 (Utah 1977) is also distinguishable.
The delay of 16 months was reasonably excusable in light
of settlement efforts between the parties.
CONCLUSION
The dismissal for lack of orosecution in this case was
well within the reasonable discretion of the Court because
the policy considerations of Rule 4l(b) were well served.
The respondent has been substantially prejudiced by the fourteen year delay.

Appellant's recent diligence can not cure

that prejudice and Rule 4l(b) sets no deadline for the
party to act.

movin~

It is respectfully submitted that this Court

should affirm the order of the District Court.
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Respectfully submitted this

IZ-----d.ay of March, 1982.

Attorney for Plaintiff and CounterDefendants-Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The foregoing Respondent's Brief was served on Defendant
Appellant by mailing two copies thereof, first class mail,
postage prepaid, to Robert R. Mallinckrodt,Esq., Mallinckrodt

& Mallinckrodt, 10 Exchange Place, Suite 1010, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111, their attorney, this

/7

day

of Harch,

1982.

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

